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Introduction
On December 15, 1995 Although academic research on the ruling initially focused on the market for players, recent work investigates the impact on national and club teams. 4 Regarding national teams, Maguire and Pearton (2000) conjecture that an influx of top foreign players to a given country will hurt its national team because it limits the development of domestic players. 5 Symmetrically, this may improve the national teams of countries exporting players to the top European domestic leagues because their skills will improve by playing against better competition. Non-academic observers largely agree with Maguire and Pearton (2000) on the impact of Bosman on national teams. For example, Gerry Sutcliffe, Minister for Sport for Britain argues "we have the best league in the world and it's great that we have got the talent. But obviously we need to see how that . . . affects the national team." 7 Similarly, England's Football Association (FA), in a report on the national team, concludes that "it is no longer possible to consider the success of the senior men's national team without acknowledging that the number of eligible players for it is declining" due to the number of foreign players in England. 8 FIFA's Blatter has called for a limit of five foreigners playing for a European club during any match. According to Blatter, having more foreigners "is not good for the development of football, for the education of young players." 9 Although the discussion to date focuses largely on the negative effects of Bosman on the national teams of the major footballing countries, the ruling may also have had positive effects. For example, an influx of top players into a country could increase the quality of the domestic league and the domestic players, improving the country's national team. 10 Furthermore, a country whose best players move to stronger leagues may see an increase or a decrease in the quality of its national team. The team would deteriorate if the players are dispersed around Europe and they no longer "understand" each other. This would be especially true if before Bosman the team was block built, i. e., its core players came from one or two clubs in the domestic league. Or if many of the country's best players move to clubs in the English Premier League, the grueling schedule may leave them exhausted or unfit for international matches.
These effects could occur immediately and/or over the longer term. For example, if the equilibrium placement of players was reached quickly and the quality of soccer improved immediately in a domestic league, an improvement in the national team would occur immediately. On the other hand, if an influx of foreign players limited the opportunities for young domestic players, the effect on the national team would not have been fully realized for some time. The current national players were fully developed and the team would weaken only as they were replaced by lower caliber players.
post-Bosman more talent will flow to the countries with the bigger markets for club soccer, increasing the disparity between club teams across countries. The competitive balance within countries, defined as the variability in strength across clubs within a country, is not affected, however.
Outside of academia, it is generally claimed that the stratification between clubs within each EU country as well as across clubs in Europe has increased since the Bosman ruling. FIFA president Joseph
Blatter believes that " [t] he gap between football's rich and poor is widening, as is the imbalance between associations and leagues." 12 He likens it to a battle between the "haves", who compete with nuclear warheads, and the "have-nots", who rely on spears. 13 This paper statistically examines the effects of the Bosman ruling on 1) the strength of national teams in Europe and 2) competitive balance within domestic leagues in the EU and also in the Champions League.
National team strength is measured by the country's ELO rating, which is a more accurate ranking during the sample period than the one constructed by FIFA. Individual countries in Europe are examined as well as broad groups of countries on average. While various national teams are affected by Bosman, the effects differ across countries and appear to be much less negative than has been hypothesized by many observers.
For example, the national teams in the countries with the greatest influx of players were unaffected by Bosman.
At the club level, the ruling did not noticeably affect competitive balance within the various domestic leagues. Across countries, evidence from the Champions League indicates that the top European clubs have become relatively stronger due to Bosman. But this also greatly increased the level of play and interest in the Champions League and some of the domestic leagues, which has been beneficial for the growth of the game worldwide. Overall, the negative effects of the Bosman ruling appear to be fairly minor.
National Team Regressions

Methodology
To test the hypothesis that Bosman affected the strength of national teams in Europe, we examine the major Euopean soccer powers which were EU members at the time of the Bosman ruling. 16 The sample consists of countries which were 1) EU members at the time of the Bosman ruling and 2) among the 20 We estimate the following equation for these fourteen countries as well as for various groups of countries:
Equation (1) is an intervention analysis model of the type discussed by Box and Tiao (1975 The ELO ratings at the beginning of March and September for each year in the sample are collected from the ELO website, as are the ratings for the ten randomly chosen countries outside Europe and South America. 21 , 22 Some discussion of the ELO data is in order. This rating system was developed by Bob Runyan in 1997 by adapting the method used by the international chess federation (FIDE) to rate players, which was created by Dr. Arpad Elo. 23 The ELO soccer ratings have been calculated back to 1872 when the first international match, between England and Scotland, took place. After every match, a country's rating is revised through an exchange of points between it and the opposing country. The number of points exchanged depends on the relative pre-match ratings of the two countries and the importance of the match, with major tournaments receiving a higher weight than friendly matches. The winning country can not lose ELO points, but if it is rated much higher than its opponent it may gain only a few (or zero) points despite winning the match. Thus, ELO ratings are a measure of national team strength based on longer term match results, as opposed to the opinions of a survey group (as in some college sport ratings in the United States).
They are similar to the FIFA rankings used by Baur and Lehmann (2008) , which are discussed further below, Cup finals a probit model is estimated with data from matches which did not end in a draw using the difference between the two teams' ELO ratings or their FIFA ratings as the explanatory variable. In the last two World Cup finals, for which pre-tournament bookmaker odds are available, the model was also estimated using the difference in the pre-tournament odds of each team winning the competition (which in an efficient capital market are the best possible forecast).
The results are reported in Table 1 . The average value of the pseudo R-squared in the four regressions using the ELO measure was .2575 compared to an average of .19 with the FIFA variable. The probit models using the ELO rating predicted the match winner correctly in 145 cases as opposed to 135 cases with the FIFA rating. This indicates that before 2007 the ELO ratings were a much better indicator of national team strength than the FIFA ratings. In the last two World Cups, probit models using the ELO measure had an average pseudo R-squared of .245 (and 78 correct forecasts) as opposed to an average pseudo R-squared of .38 (and 77 correct forecasts) when the betting odds are used. Although the ELO ratings do not fit the data as well as bookmaker odds, the latter are not a time series measure of national team strength.
Therefore the ELO ratings provide the best available measure of national team strength and are used in the tests which follow.
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The average ELO rating for the fourteen European nations is examined along with the averages for two subgroups. Group 1 consists of the so-called "Big Six" countries with the strongest domestic leagues, the highest average attendance and apparently the greatest percentage of foreign players -Germany, England, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Group 2 contains the remaining eight countries in the sample. for England.
The average ELO ratings for the fourteen countries and the two subgroups are much less variable than the individual country ELOs, indicating that tests with the European and group average data should be powerful. For example, the European average ELO has a minimum value of 1799 and a maximum value of 1863 during this period, with a standard deviation of only 17. The standard deviation of the Group 1 average is somewhat greater than that of the European average but the Group 2 average is as variable as the European average. The average rating for the 10 third world countries is as variable as the Group 1 average and ranges from 1526 (the first observation in the time series) to 1629 (the last observation). This reflects the increase in the quality of soccer outside Europe and South America during this time period. As expected, the ELO ratings are highly positively autocorrelated, with all first order autocorrelations greater than .50.
Empirical Results
The coefficient estimates and related statistics from equation (1), when the dependent is the average rating for a group of countries, are reported in Regarding the Bosman ruling, the fourteen countries were on average significantly positively affected immediately by the court decision, with the average ELO rating increasing by 10.69. However, over the longer term Bosman significantly decreased the average ELO rating of these countries by 33.83. The overall effect of Bosman on these countries over ten years, which is the sum of the estimates of α 5 and α 6 , is an average decrease in the ELO rating of about 23 points (which is statistically significant in tests at the five per cent level). While the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at well beyond the five per cent level, this is partly due to the power of the tests. The overall effect for European national teams on average does not appear to be especially large. Based on recent ELO ratings a team ranked in the top 50 in the world would on average drop two or three places in the rankings --for example, the number 10 ranked national team in the world would drop to number 12 or 13 over twelve years --if its ELO rating fell by 23 points.
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The results for the two groups within the fourteen countries provide insight into the behavior of the sample average. The Big Six countries were immediately positively affected by the ruling, with the average ELO rating increasing by more than 21 points. This estimate is reliably different from zero in tests at the five per cent level. There is also a significant (at the ten per cent level) longer term negative effect of Bosman on these countries on average, but the overall effect of the ruling is not statistically significant. For the Group 2 countries the estimate of α 5 is statistically insignificant but there is a significant negative longer term effect of Bosman on these countries on average. This is consistent with the national teams of the Group 1 and 2 countries being negatively impacted in the longer term by Bosman. Thus, the immediate positive impact of Bosman on European national teams is driven by the Big Six while the longer term negative effect is due to both groups of countries.
The regression results for the individual national teams are reported in Table 4 . The adjusted Rsquareds range from .279 to .889 but they are generally above .50. 28 The coefficient estimates, including those related to Bosman, vary considerably across the sample countries. The lagged ELO rating has significant explanatory power in all fourteen regressions and there is a significant time trend (at the ten per Turning to the effects of the Bosman ruling, six of the fourteen countries in the sample were significantly affected immediately by the decision. Four of these countries are in the Big Six and, as evidenced by the Group 1 regression reported in 
Competitive Balance at the Club Level
It has long been recognized (see Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964)) that professional sports differs fundamentally from other industries. In the standard industry it is of little concern if some competing firms are better (more efficient) than others. In fact, this is to be encouraged because societal welfare is maximized by increasing efficiency (lowering production costs). However, the degree of interest in professional sporting events, and therefore the success of a league overall is positively related to how competitive the teams are because fans are not interested in competitions with very predictable or very lopsided outcomes.
Vrooman (1996) proposes three separate measures of competitive balance: 1) the variability of performance across teams in the league ("across team" competitive balance), 2) the continuity of team performance over time ("across season" competitive balance) and 3) the extent to which certain teams dominate the league ("league dominance"). If each season there is a wide dispersion in team strength (and therefore the final results, measured in soccer by a statistic such as total points earned) then many matches will be one sided and fan interest in those matches will be fairly low. Similarly, if each club finishes in roughly the same place in the league year in and year out, the season is fairly predictable and the fans will find the competition uninteresting. Regarding league dominance, if the same teams finish atop the league on a regular basis then the battle for the championship will be very predictable, which can negatively affect fan interest in the league overall. These three aspects of competitive balance are empirically examined for the domestic leagues of the sample countries before and after Bosman. Furthermore, because the UEFA Champions League is a club competition which overarches the various domestic leagues, we also examine dominance in that league.
To examine whether the Bosman ruling increased the stratification within the domestic leagues in The results, along with the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the variance changed after the Bosman ruling, are reported in Table 5 . 30 In five of 11 countries the variance estimate increased after Bosman and in six countries it decreased. However, only in Greece is there a significant (in two tailed tests at the ten per cent level) change in the variance of points earned across teams. Therefore, consistent with Haan et al. We examine across season competitive balance with the data used to construct Table 5 , except the variable of interest is the change in the number of points earned by each team between consecutive seasons.
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The results are reported in Table 6 . In four countries the estimated variance of the across season point change increased after Bosman and in seven countries it decreased. However, only four of these changes are statistically significant in two tailed tests at the ten per cent level. In England, consistent with casual observation, and Greece the variance decreased significantly, indicating that club performance became less In the 1997/1998 competition the runners-up from the top eight leagues the previous year were also included.
Currently, some domestic leagues send their top four teams to the Champions League.
To examine the effect of Bosman on the Champions League, we adjust the data to control for the Six. The t-statistic to test the hypothesis that the probability did not change is 3.10, which rejects the null hypothesis of no effect due to Bosman at well beyond the one per cent level. 37 Clearly, the influx of top players to these countries has helped their clubs noticeably in soccer's most prestigious club competition.
This increased stratification across club teams in the Europe is not necessarily bad, however. First, it creates all-star type clubs where the eleven starting players, and in some cases all the rostered players, are outstanding. When these teams meet, just as when national teams meet in the World Cup, spectators see the highest form of the art. Second, its effects are seen only in the Champions League, which is a cup type of competition, similar to the cups in the various domestic soccer leagues. One feature of cup competitions which makes them more exciting and increases spectator interest is the fact that they pit the Davids against the Goliaths and the Davids sometimes win. For example, the domestic league cups in Europe include clubs from lower professional leagues as well as amateur clubs. The Bosman ruling, because it increased the stratification across leagues, has amplified this variability within the Champions League. Similarly, the creation post-Bosman of some four all-star teams in the English Premier League has made it the world's most watched sporting league. 38 Although it is fairly predictable which clubs will finish in the top four spots, it
is not clear which one will win the championship. To the extent that the flow of talent to England, the other Big Six Countries and the top teams in the Champions League has increased interest in the game in North America and Asia, the Bosman ruling has been a great success in terms of promoting football in those regions.
Conclusion
While there has been considerable discussion about the effects of the Bosman ruling, by academics, club and federation officials, players and spectators, there have been only a handful of empirical studies of its effects on national and club teams in Europe. We find that while some national teams were negatively/positively affected by Bosman, the average effect on the Big Six countries (which apparently have had the greatest influx of high quality players) and other European nations was fairly small. Certainly the Big Six as a whole, including England, have not been greatly affected.
At the club level, competitive balance in the domestic leagues, measured in any of several ways, has not decreased overall (although England, which has been the subject of the most discussion, has clearly been affected) . That is, imported players have gone to a variety of clubs, not just the top teams, largely preserving the competitiveness of the various leagues. The clubs have become more stratified across countries with teams from the Big Six more heavily dominating the Champions League since the decision in Bosman. The free flow of players has, however, turned the Champions League, and some of the domestic leagues, into virtual super leagues, showcasing a number of "all star" teams which has also greatly increasing interest in the game worldwide.
All things considered, the negative effects of Bosman appear to be fairly small. Furthermore, they must be balanced against the ruling's positive effects, including those on the market for players and interest in soccer around the world. Hopefully this paper and further empirical research on the subject will provide evidence useful to policy makers in various countries as well as broader governing bodies such as UEFA, FIFA and the EU parliament. Furthermore, if the decrease in the quality of some European national teams is an important concern, it can be addressed without restricting the movement of players (as Joseph Blatter's "6+5" proposal would do). One alternative is for UEFA to impose a lump sum "tax" on the Champions
League and UEFA Cup revenues and transfer this money, based on how many players from each country play their club soccer for a top team abroad, to the countries exporting these players for further training and development of their national teams. Table 3 Estimates from Equation (1) Table 4 Estimates from Equation (1) 
18.
We also estimate a variant of equation (1) which includes two lags of the ELO rating as explanatory variables. Only the coefficient estimates on the first lag of ELO t are statistically significant.
19.
We focus on 1991 because the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites, such as Poland and Romania, gained their freedom in 1990 while various Soviet republics, such as the Ukraine, separated from Russia in 1992.
20.
Several alternative specifications of equation (1) are also estimated. They allow D2 t to increase right after Bosman (in March 1996) or four years after Bosman (in March 2000), they have the step up in D2 t to occur over eight or 12 years rather than 10 years or D1 t equals one starting in March 1997 or March 1998 as opposed to March 1996. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported below.
21.
The ratings are available at www.eloratings.net and were created using data supplied by Advanced Satellite Consulting. The ten third world countries are New Zealand, Angola, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Honduras, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Mexico and Guatemala.
22.
Before German reunification, Germany's ELO rating is that of West Germany. Similarly, the rating for the USSR is used as the rating for Russia before the break up of the Soviet Union. Any change in the series due to these political changes is measured by the coefficient on D1991 t .
23.
A detailed description of the ELO methodology, including the equation used to revise each country's rating, is available at www.eloratings.net/system.html.
24.
The highest ELO rating ever, 2165, was achieved by Hungary in 1954.
25.
The odds also capture other factors unrelated to overall national team strength, such as weather, altitude and field conditions, which can be used to forecast match outcomes.
26.
The Durbin-Watson statistics are close to two, indicating that the residuals are not first order autocorrelated. The Box-Ljung statistics show little evidence of higher order autocorrelation. Also, the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are corrected in the RATS software package for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
27.
On April 24, 2008 Brazil (ranked number one in the world) had an ELO rating of 2062 while Guinea (ranked number fifty-one) had a rating of 1609. Therefore, on average the top 51 national teams were separated from the next highest rated team by about nine ELO points.
28.
Most of the Durbin-Watson statistics are close to two.
29.
Denmark and Norway are dropped from the analysis because there are not two or more seasons before the Bosman ruling (the season ending in 1995 or before) where the league had the same number of teams as after the ruling. Scotland is excluded because starting in 2001 the domestic league broke into two divisions after 33 matches. The season during which the Bosman ruling became effective, 1995 to 1996, is left out of the analysis.
30.
Because the F-distribution is not symmetric and significance is determined using tables based on its right tail, in each case the larger variance estimate (regardless of whether it comes before or after Bosman) is divided by the smaller estimate to calculate the F-statistic. The critical value is that for α (the size of the two tailed test) divided by two, as in a two tailed t-test.
31.
For example, Arsenal earned 76 points in the English Premier League in 1989 and 62 points in 1990. Therefore the observation for Arsenal in 1990 equals -14. To be included in the sample for year t, the club must have been in the league during year t and t -1. The change between season ending in 1995 and the one ending in 1996 is excluded from the analysis because the Bosman ruling occurred during the latter.
32.
The top three results are not affected by changes in league size because adding or subtracting teams to the league essentially impacts only the bottom of the league table.
33.
Because the variable of interest (whether a club finishing in the top three did so the previous season) is Bernoulli distributed, p 2 and p 1 are estimates of the mean of the distribution before and after Bosman. By the Central Limit Theorem, p 2 and p 1 are asymptotically normally distributed and a standard t test of the hypothesis that the means are equal is appropriate.
34.
The significant results for England in Tables 6 and 7 may, in fact, be due to the formation of the English Premier League in 1992, which decreased the sharing of television revenues among the clubs. Therefore the effects of Bosman on the domestic leagues may be even smaller than the tests in Section 3 indicate.
35.
The initial 1955/1956 season is excluded because the sixteen entrants included only seven league champions.
36.
Before 1997/1998, if the winner of the Champions League the previous year also won its domestic league, the second place finisher in the latter automatically qualified for the Champions League. We include these teams when tabulating the semi-finalists from Big Six countries beginning with 1997/1998.
37.
If we exclude the five years beginning with the 1985/1986 season, when English clubs were banned from European competitions following the Heysel disaster, before Bosman 92 of the 136 semifinalists (.676) in the Champions League were from the Big Six and the t-statistic testing the hypothesis that the percentage changed after Bosman equals 2.77.
38.
Dennis Campbell. "United (versus Liverpool) Nations" The Observer. January 1, 2002. 
